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11 Introduction
A typical situation where the risk perception of the insurer and that of policyholders
diﬀer is one in which each party knows something that the other does not. The in-
surer may correctly assess the impact on risk of an individual’s characteristics without
observing them all, whereas policyholders may know all their characteristics without
relating them correctly to their risks. These simple and realistic assumptions in-
evitably introduce imperfect risk perception and adverse selection.
In articles combining adverse selection with nonexpected utility, Young and Browne
(2001) and Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) study, respectively, the Rothschild-Stiglitz
equilibrium and the monopolist’s problem. Though the modeling is similar, our objec-
tive is wider: rather than focusing on particular allocations, we study the whole set of
optimal risk sharing in a context that we interpret as twofold asymmetric information.
Redistribution possibilities and insurance quality under the informational con-
straints are ﬁrst characterized. We show that the set of feasible redistributions is a
convex subset of the redistributions that a ﬁrst best economy would allow, and that
the set of second-best eﬃcient redistributions is a convex subset of all feasible redistri-
butions. In other terms, the social planner should limit itself to moderate redistribu-
tion. Due to imperfect risk perception, in general none of the types gets full insurance.
More precisely, we show that the type which values most (respectively least) insur-
ance is increasingly overcovered (respectively undercovered) as wealth transfers in his
favor increase. This generalizes results by Crocker and Snow (1985) and Dionne and
Fombaron (1996) to the context of imperfect risk perception.
Risk perception biases are the critical factors in determining the nature of risk
sharing. We distinguish between weak and strong adverse selection. The former
occurs when agents overstate the diﬀerence between types: they tend not to envy
the others’ optimal insurance and the economy admits a continuum of undistorted
incentive compatible allocations. The latter occurs when agents underestimate the
diﬀerences between types: the weight of incentive constraints is maximal and there is
a continuum of distorted pooling allocations. In a model where policyholders diﬀer
by their risk aversions and costs of eﬀort, de Meza and Webb (2001) ﬁnd ineﬃcient
equilibrium pooling. They can solve partially this problem with appropriate taxation,
2but the constrained eﬃcient allocations and the means of implementing them are not
explored.
Finally, we question the eﬀects of improving risk perception. In the context of
pure adverse selection ` a la Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976), reducing (statistically) the ex-
isting asymmetries of information through categorical discrimination enhances welfare
(Crocker and Snow, 1986). The intuition is that a fraction of the costs that incentive
compatibility constraints impose on the mechanism can be economized. Our message
is quite diﬀerent. In a Bayesian setting, an improved understanding of risk on the
part of policyholders typically corresponds to polarization in some segments, and to
depolarization in others. But only the polarization of beliefs facilitates redistribu-
tion and guarantees welfare gains for all the segment, the argument being that, for
given risks, more diﬀerent tastes soften the impact of self-selection constraints. We
discuss the ambiguity of the impact of public information campaigns when they are
not accompanied with appropriate transfers.
Our departure from the assumption that policyholders are better informed raises
two issues. The ﬁrst is their resistance to learning their risk. The second is the
objective of the social planner: should it maximize utilities as actually perceived by
the consumers or maximize utilities calculated with true probabilities? These issues
are addressed in turn.
Resistance to learning. The causes of adverse selection are well known, but why
doesn’t the consumer infer his type from the contracts he is oﬀered? The sophisticated
consumer would think: “if I prefer an oﬀer which is seen by the insurer as appropriate
to a certain type, I should infer that I have this type and therefore improve my
probability assessment” (Villeneuve, forthcoming).
We assume away this possibility. The objective of this paper is to analyze the
situation where policyholders are not able to reconstruct the reasoning of the insurer.
Deducting one’s unknown characteristics requires an unlikely knowledge of the com-
position (types and proportions) of the pool one belongs with. For example, a menu
may redistribution wealth between policyholders; in that case, the insurance premium
of the contract one prefers is not actuarially fair and its interpretation is ambiguous.
Moreover, if the consumer fails to observe which oﬀers are taken by some other con-
3sumers, he may attach importance to contracts that are never chosen in actuality. In
sum, the policyholder lacks the key parameters that meaningful inference demands.
Welfare. In front of consumers that somewhat err in their risk assessment, the
social planner faces a dilemma: should consumers’ preferences be taken as they are
or as they should be? Whatever the choice, some insurance can be provided, though
coverage may be less than perfect. The ex ante Pareto optimum (EA) amounts
to taking consumers’ preferences as they are at the moment of choice, i.e. based on
subjective probabilities. The ex post Pareto optimum (EP) is evaluated with the true
distribution of loss ex post, which amounts to considering consumers’ preferences as
they should be. These two concepts disagree in general.
An EA is decentralizable (after appropriate redistribution) since competitive in-
surers base their strategies on the actual (not the ideal) preferences of the consumers.
By contrast, an EP program is implementable only via centralized provision, which
is a political and practical disadvantage. For this reason, EA is privileged in the
paper. A comparison between EA and EP will be given in the case of strong adverse
selection.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 sets up the insurance model with subjective
belief and adverse selection. Section 3 explores the whole set of constrained Pareto
optima for given objective probabilities and risk perceptions. Section 4 presents the
comparative statics with respect to risk perception.
2 Model
2.1 Consumers, risk and insurance
Throughout the paper, we consider a unique benevolent insurer (hereafter “the in-
surer”) in charge of implementing the constrained Pareto optima that the social plan-
ner chooses. The insurer is assumed to be risk neutral and is constrained to make no
losses.
There is a continuum of two types of consumers i and j in proportions λi and λj
respectively (λi + λj = 1), and one commodity in the economy. Each consumer faces
4an individual risk, with two individual states s = 1 (no loss) and s = 2 (loss).
The objective probability pi of being in state 2 (loss) for a type-i individual is
statistically known to the insurer (pi 6= pj). Individual risks are assumed to be inde-
pendently distributed, and both types have the same initial contingent endowment
ω = (ω1,ω2) ∈ R∗2
+. We suppose that consumers evaluate “expected” utility with the
same VNM utility function u deﬁned over R∗
+. However, they use diﬀerent subjective
probabilities (qi and qj, respectively). We do not assume that qi and qj are ranked
like pi and pj.
We propose a Bayesian interpretation of the discrepancy between risk assessments.
There are two risk factors: one is privately observed by policyholders and takes one of
two possible values, i and j, the other is privately observed by the insurer and takes
one of two possible values, a and b. In a given insurance segment (say policyholders
bearing marker a), there are two “types” (i,a) and (j,a), whose loss probabilities are
perceived diﬀerently by the parties. If we drop the segment marker, we retrieve pi, pj
for the insurer and qi, qj for the policyholders, all these parameters being conditional
probabilities.
This is not restrictive for the understanding of optimal risk-sharing. Indeed, op-
timal risk-sharing is decomposable into two dimensions: within a segment (a or b),
and between segments (a to b or the other way around). For the social planner, the
latter is trivial, since, by deﬁnition, segments are based on the insurer’s information.
This paper develops the former dimension.
With the Bayesian interpretation, there are overall restrictions on the subjective
probabilities but to integrate interpretations other than the Bayesian one, we have
chosen to keep the four parameters (pi,pj,qi,qj) free. The assumption that policy-
holders do not revise their beliefs as they see the contracts they are oﬀered denies
common knowledge. Our arguments are in the Introduction.
2.2 Contracts and type-eﬃciency
Insurance contracts consist in an exchange, by the policyholder, of risk ω for a con-
ditional consumption plan x = (x1,x2). As in Prescott and Townsend (1984), x1 and
x2 might be lotteries. This approach is more general and many proofs are simpliﬁed.
Indeed, the decision variables of the insurer are now a ﬁnite number of probability
5distributions over the consumption set (a pair of contracts here is a quadruple of dis-
tributions). The objective, the choice sets and the feasibility constraints (incentive,
proﬁt) are linear with respect to these variables. Linear programming results, like
uniqueness or continuity with respect to exogenous parameters, can be invoked (see
also Landsberger and Meilijson, 1999). Lotteries do not seem to be observed empir-
ically. Accordingly, Proposition 1 shows that for optimal allocations (constrained or
not), contracts are always “degenerate”.
Given a contract x, the insurer’s net proﬁt πk(x) depends on the consumer’s type:
πk(x) = (1 − pk)(ω1 − Ex1) + pk (ω2 − Ex2),∀k = i,j, (1)
and the consumer’s utility is
uk(x) = (1 − qk)Eu(x1) + qk Eu(x2),∀k = i,j. (2)
The expectation operator E only recalls that lotteries are allowed.





Full insurance means a coverage rate of 1, underinsurance a coverage rate of less than
1 and overinsurance a coverage rate of more than 1. The curve of contracts ensuring
a constant coverage is an income expansion path.
In any unconstrained Pareto optimal allocation (xi,xj), no lotteries are used and
each type’s marginal rate of substitution is equal to that of the insurer:







A contract xk satisfying the above condition is said to be k-eﬃcient, or simply type-
eﬃcient in the absence of ambiguity. The related coverage rate is denoted by ck.
Type eﬃciency does not mean full insurance when objective probability and beliefs
diﬀer. An optimistic consumer (qk < pk) has an optimal coverage strictly lower than
the full coverage rate (ck < 1), and the rate of coverage is higher than 1 for a
pessimistic consumer (ck > 1).
62.3 Feasible allocations and redistribution proﬁle
In the situation of adverse selection that we assume, implementing Pareto opti-
mal allocations (type-eﬃcient contracts and no proﬁt overall) is impossible in gen-
eral, though there are important exceptions. Indeed, a pair of eﬃcient contracts
x• = (xi,xj) is likely to violate one (or more) incentive compatibility constraints
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
We apply the revelation principle to reason directly on menus. We have indeed a
classical principal-agent structure. Any allocation that can be implemented by some
mechanism can also be implemented via a direct mechanism in which consumers are
oﬀered a menu of two contracts. We denote by F the set of feasible menus, i.e. menus
that are incentive compatible and that satisfy the resource constraint:








The redistribution of expected wealth is parametrized by the proﬁt proﬁle π• =
(πi,πj). For any π•, we deﬁne
Fπ• = {(xi,xj)|πi(xi) ≥ πi ; πj(xj) ≥ πj ; ui(xi) ≥ ui(xj) ; uj(xj) ≥ uj(xi)} (6)
as the set of menus for which proﬁt proﬁle π• is feasible. All sets Fπ• or F comprise
quadruples of probability distributions. Constraints being linear, these sets are linear
and convex. By linear of u with respect to probabilities, the set of feasible payoﬀs
u(F) is convex.
A proﬁt proﬁle making zero proﬁt is called a redistribution proﬁle. The set of fea-
sible redistribution proﬁles, which is denoted by Π, is a segment (a convex, bounded,
one-dimensional set in R2).
3 Welfare analysis of transfers
3.1 Redistribution constrained optima
The second fundamental theorem of welfare states that any redistribution is compat-
ible with eﬃciency, provided that the Walrasian market mechanism determines the
7allocation. The following deﬁnition will serve to show how second-best economies
depart from ﬁrst-best economies. Pareto dominance is envisaged in terms of ex ante
welfare (EA in the Introduction).
Deﬁnition 1 (RCO) x• is a redistribution constrained optimum (RCO) relative to
proﬁt proﬁle π• if it is not Pareto-dominated in Fπ•.
Under symmetric information, an RCO is always a Pareto optimum. Under asym-
metric information, this concept of eﬃciency is weaker than second-best optimality,
since we ignore for the moment whether the proﬁt proﬁle we consider is compatible
or not with second-best eﬃciency.
The proposition shows the relationships between the redistribution proﬁles, the
set of RCOs and the frontier of the set of implementable payoﬀs.
Proposition 1 Under adverse selection,
1. The RCO related to some feasible proﬁt proﬁle π• is unique; the contracts sup-
porting it are degenerate, they Pareto-dominate all the menus in Fπ•; the budget
constraints by type are both binding;
2. The application which associates to any feasible redistribution proﬁle the unique
related RCO, Π → F,π• 7→ b x• = (b xi,b xj), is continuous;
3. The application which associates to any feasible redistribution proﬁle the utilities
of the types at the related RCO, Π → u(F),π• 7→ (u(b xi),u(b xj)), is one-to-one
and its image is a continuous portion of the frontier of u(F).
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
It is never socially desirable that the insurer retains positive proﬁt (ﬁrst point).
The rest of the paper works with redistribution proﬁles and their unique RCOs (second
point). Eﬃcient RCOs are on the North-East frontier of u(F). The corresponding
redistribution proﬁles are said to be eﬃcient and they form a convex subset of Π
(third point). When RCOs are sought via weighted sums of the types’ utilities, the
greater the weight assigned to a type, the greater the expected wealth this type
receives. Ineﬃcient RCOs correspond to negative weights given to one of the types
and extreme transfers.
8The Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation, that is the unique candidate equilibrium in the
standard model, is in fact the RCO associated with the no-redistribution proﬁle. For
the very reason that an implementable redistribution proﬁle may not be eﬃcient, the
Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation may not be a second-best optimum.
3.2 Redistribution and coverage
The critical question with second-best optima is whether or not types are eﬃciently
insured. Next proposition shows that the type whose expected wealth is low gets a
type-eﬃcient contract at the RCO.
Proposition 2 Consider a redistribution proﬁle in Π and the corresponding RCO
(b xi,b xj),
1. If type j’s incentive constraint is not binding, b xi is i-eﬃcient.
2. If b xi is i-eﬃcient, then type i’s contract remains i-eﬃcient at the RCO when
more wealth is transferred from type i to type j.
A direct corollary is that there are two thresholds in redistribution levels, each
separating, for a given type, RCOs assigning type-eﬃcient contracts from RCOs as-
signing type-ineﬃcient contracts.
In the standard model (qi = pi and qj = pj), the two thresholds are identical, and
for this particular redistribution, all types are fully insured at the average price. For
any other redistribution proﬁle, the type that receives low transfers is assigned an
eﬃcient contract, not the other.
In our more general setting, we retrieve this idea for relatively low and relatively
high transfers. However, for intermediate transfers (i.e. between the two thresholds),
RCOs assign type-eﬃcient contracts either to both types or to neither. This important
diﬀerence with the Rothschild-Stiglitz model that we ﬁnd is explored in more detail
in Section 4. We show there how it relates with the biases of risk perception.
Coverage varies with the expected wealth allocated to a type. The simplest fact
is that any pair of contracts that satisﬁes incentive constraints is such that the type
that values coverage more (i.e. with the highest subjective loss probability) gets more
coverage. The proposition goes further.
9Proposition 3 At the RCO,
1. The coverage rate of the type which values coverage more (resp. less) is greater
(resp. smaller) than this type’s optimal coverage rate.
2. The coverage rate of the type which values coverage more (resp. less) increases
(resp. decreases) with the expected wealth this type receives.
In the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, the ﬁrst point means that the high risk is fully
insured for a small expected wealth, but that this type receives overinsurance if trans-
fers overpass those implicit in the average actuarially fair full insurance (Dionne and
Fombaron, 1996). The only way by which one can implement such high transfers is
by providing overinsurance that low risk policyholders value less.
The second point goes further in the comparative statics. The intuition is simple
but requires a careful proof. Increasing transfers increases the weight of incentive
constraints: it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to discourage the disadvantaged type
from choosing the advantaged type’s contract. The increasingly generous contract
has to be increasingly distorted away from the coverage quality the envious type likes
most. This causes the ineﬃciency of extreme transfers: at some point, the marginal
distortion (degraded quality) becomes too costly compared with the beneﬁt of the
marginal increase of expected consumption.
4 The eﬀects of risk perception
4.1 Weak and strong adverse selection
Under adverse selection, signiﬁcant redistribution causes envy and therefore distor-
tions are necessary to circumvent it. What happens with moderate redistribution?
What it the minimal distortion one can expect in an economy? The economy is said to
exhibit weak adverse selection when the intersection of ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocations
and second-best allocations is non-empty. It exhibits strong adverse selection when
the intersection is empty, i.e. when envy always restricts eﬃciency. These qualitative
properties critically depend on risk perception.
10Proposition 4 The economy exhibits weak (strong) adverse selection if and only if
subjective accident probability and optimal coverage are positively (negatively) corre-
lated (qi − qj) · (ci − cj) ≥ (<)0.
Strong adverse selection corresponds to the situation in which there is a contra-
diction between ﬁrst-best requirements (e.g. ci > cj : type i should be more covered
than type j) and feasibility constraints (e.g. qi < qj : type i will be less covered than
type j). This excludes that both types receive type-eﬃcient contracts at the same
time. This is an instance of the phenomenon that Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984) name
nonresponsiveness.
Fix the objective probabilities with pi > pj. Figure 2 is the phase diagram of
the model when qi and qj vary from 0 to 1. Between the frontiers qi = qj and ci =
cj,1 the economy exhibits strong adverse selection, outside, it exhibits weak adverse
selection. Strong adverse selection is met under two conditions: risk perceptions
are relatively close, and they are positively correlated with true probabilities. The
Rothschild-Stiglitz model is represented by the unique point qi = pi and qj = pj. In
any neighborhood of that economy, strong and weak adverse selection are possible.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
For intermediate redistribution, contracts are either both type-eﬃcient or type-
ineﬃcient (a corollary of Proposition 2). Under weak adverse selection, intermediate
RCOs assign type-eﬃcient contracts (no adverse eﬀects of adverse selection), while
under strong adverse selection, intermediate RCOs assign a pooling, i.e. a unique
contract which is type-ineﬃcient for both types.
In the particular but signiﬁcant case where types do not perceive their diﬀerence
(qi = qj), there is a unique second-best optimum.2 Each type is assigned a type-
eﬃcient contract, since the economy exhibiting weak adverse selection, this unique
allocation is necessarily a ﬁrst-best optimum. The two contracts in the menu are
1Notice that ci(qi,qj) = cj(qi,qj) is a section of an ellipse passing through (0,0), (pi,pj) and

















2Incentive compatibility imposes that the two types receive the same utility in a given RCO. The
RCO that provides maximum utility is the unique second-best optimum.
11equivalent for both types but, in equilibrium, the right type must choose the right
contract. The implementability of this allocation depends on the ability of the insurer
to coordinate policyholders on the appropriate choices.3
The two objectives (EA and EP) discussed in the Introduction are sometimes
reconciled. With strong adverse selection and intermediate redistribution, incentive
constraints command and types are pooled: the objective of the social planner is
locally irrelevant. By contrast, under weak adverse selection, EA and EP always
disagree.
4.2 Feasibility and eﬃciency with polarized beliefs
Intuitively, diﬀerences in tastes facilitate the implementation of diﬀerent contracts
since envy-free conditions are easier to satisfy. Interpreted in terms of risk perception,
this idea suggests that, other things equal, increasing the disparity between beliefs
alleviates incentive constraints. In this section, we consider changes of the consumers
beliefs, without aﬀecting the objective parameters pi and pj.
Deﬁnition 2 Consider beliefs Q = (qi,qj). Beliefs Qe = (qe
i,qe
j) are a polarization
of Q if, when qi > qj then qe
i ≥ qi and qj ≥ qe
j (with at least one strict inequality).
The contrary of polarization is depolarization.
Theorem 1 Let beliefs Qe be a polarization of beliefs Q.
1. The set of feasible menus associated with Qe is greater than the one associated
with Q ;
2. The set of transfers associated with Qe such that type i gets an i-eﬃcient con-
tract at the RCO is greater than the one associated with Q ;
3. The set of eﬃcient transfers associated with Qe is greater than the one associ-
ated with Q.
We come back to the Bayesian interpretation of the model and show the ambiguous
eﬀects of information sharing. Assume that segments a and b are such that pja = pjb =
3When beliefs diﬀer, the issue is less disturbing since, for all ε > 0, an ε-optimum, with strong
preference for their contracts on the part of the types, always exists.
12qj = pj (type j is not aﬀected by the factor the insurer observes) but pia > qi > pib
(being a is bad news and being b is good news for type-i).
Should the insurer disclose the risk factor? In segment a, this implies passing
from risk perceptions (qi,qj) to risk perceptions (pia,pj). This is a polarization only
if qi > qj. Conversely, disclosing the risk factor in segment b is a polarization only
if qi < qj. In other words, disclosing the information cannot improve welfare, in the
sense of the Theorem, in both groups.
Theoretically, limiting the transmission of information to the well chosen segment
could be welfare improving: if qi > qj, “say bad news, never say goods news” (tell a,
not b); if qi < qj, “say good news, never say bad news” (tell b, not a). In practice,
targeting a or b might be unfeasible and the open question now is whether a pub-
lic information campaign associated with compensatory transfers between segments
enhances welfare.
5 Conclusion
The possible ineﬃciency in the Rothschild and Stiglitz model hinges on the market’s
inability to perform transfers between types. To overcome this failure, the simplest
policy is to choose the optimum one wants to implement, then to impose the basic
uniform coverage performing the desired redistribution, and ﬁnally to leave the market
reach the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium (Crocker and Snow, 1985).
Previous results on redistribution remained unclear as to the degrees of freedom
left for public choice (Dahlby 1981, Crocker and Snow 1985). The ﬁrst contribution
of this paper is to prove that second-best allocations are conﬁned to a convex set
of redistribution proﬁles. If redistribution goes further, the allocation becomes inef-
ﬁcient, and if it goes even further, it becomes unimplementable. We indicate how
incentive constraints, through risk perception and derived tastes, distort the quality
of insurance: the greater the expected wealth a type receives, the lesser the quality
of coverage this type is assigned.
The second contribution is to ﬁnd that for a large set of parameters, pooling types
is second-best eﬃcient. In the case of strong adverse selection, for a convex set of
transfers, none of the types obtains a type-eﬃcient contract. This contrasts with
13the original Rothschild-Stiglitz economy, in which the only eﬃcient pooling is the
average fair full insurance. Our model permits degrees of freedom in risk perception.
We show that if for some parameters a redistribution proﬁle is eﬃcient, then it remains
so as risk perception polarizes. Said diﬀerently, if for some initial endowment, the
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium exists, existence is not lost by polarization.
Last but not least, this paper proposes a Bayesian interpretation of the disparity
between risk perception and true probabilities in terms of two-sided asymmetric infor-
mation. We show that when the insurer cannot observe the information policyholders
possess, information transmission from the insurer to policyholders has ambiguous ef-
fects. We propose an important example in which, in one market segment, eﬃciency
requires risk perception improvement, while in the other segment, information shar-
ing hardens the incentive constraints. The original criterion we propose to evaluate
eﬃciency gains (more eﬃcient redistribution, more contracts) deserves development.
14A Appendix
Technical note. In the proofs, we adopt the weak topology for lotteries, but to
simplify, we never write the restriction “almost surely”. Two lotteries are considered
as equal if their consequences diﬀer only for events of null probability.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The maximum element in Fπ•. Fix π• and suppose that Fπ• is non-empty. Deﬁne
Cπ• as the set of contracts appearing in some menu of Fπ• (x• = (xi,xj) ∈ Fπ• ⇒
xi ∈ Cπ•; xj ∈ Cπ•). Deﬁne xM
k ∈ argmaxx∈Cπ• uk(x) for k = i,j. By continuity
of u, Cπ• is closed, therefore xM
i and xM
j are in Cπ•. There is a contract Xi ∈ Cπ•
such that ui(Xi) ≥ ui(xM
i ) and πi(Xi) ≥ πi (possibly, Xi = xM
i ). Similarly, there is a
contract Xj ∈ Cπ• such that uj(Xj) ≥ uj(xM




j are such that ui(xM
i ) ≥ ui(Xj) and uj(xM
j ) ≥ uj(Xi). The
preceding conditions imply that menu (Xi,Xj) ∈ Fπ• dominates (weakly) any other
menu of Fπ•, and uk(Xk) = uk(xM
k ). This implies that there is at least one maximum
element of Fπ• which is, necessarily, an RCO.
Binding constraints. We prove that for RCO (Xi,Xj), proﬁt constraints by type
are binding. We reason by contradiction. Suppose that πi(Xi) > πi. The components
of Xi are denoted by ˜ x1 and ˜ x2, which are lotteries a priori (Xi = (˜ x1, ˜ x2)). As u
is concave, the degenerate lottery (u−1(Eu(˜ x1)),u−1(Eu(˜ x2))), instead of Xi, imple-
ments the same payoﬀs for the types, but yields a larger proﬁt than πi. There is an
open ball B around (u−1(Eu(x1)),u−1(Eu(x2))) in which πi(·) > πi. Now we deﬁne
the (degenerate) contract Xε,η = (x1,x2) by the following equations:
u(x1) = Eu(˜ x1) + ε, (8)
u(x2) = Eu(˜ x2) + η. (9)
Proﬁt functions being continuous, ε and η exist such that Xε,η is in B and veriﬁes
(1 − qi)ε + qi η > 0, (10)
(1 − qj)ε + qj η < 0. (11)
15It follows that (Xε,η,Xj) satisﬁes incentive constraints, belongs to Fπ•, and ui(Xε,η) >
ui(Xi), a contradiction. Moreover, Xi is composed of degenerate lotteries, else (X0,0,Xj)
would be a menu belonging to Fπ•, yielding the same utility as (Xi,Xj), which would
verify πi(X0,0) > πi, a contradiction.
Uniqueness of the RCO and continuity of the mapping. For a given redistri-
bution proﬁle π•, RCOs are unique in terms of utilities implemented, since they are
all maximum elements of Fπ•. Therefore that they are all solution of the following
program (the objective could be any other function increasing in ui and uj):
max
xi,xj
ui(xi) + uj(xj) (12)
s.t. ui(xi) ≥ ui(xj);uj(xj) ≥ uj(xi);πi(xi) ≥ πi;πj(xj) ≥ πj.
The constraints and the objective are continuous with respect to π• and the objective
is never collinear to a constraint,4 therefore the solution is necessarily at a corner.
This implies that the solution is unique, and that the mapping which associates that
solution to any feasible redistribution is continuous.
The application Π → U,π• 7→ u•. Consider an RCO b x•, associated with a redis-
tribution proﬁle in Π, whose payoﬀs are b u• = (b ui,b uj). We prove that b u• cannot be in
the interior of u(F). We reason by contradiction: assume that b u• has a neighborhood
v in the interior of u(F). Choose two points (b ui,b uj+ε) and (b ui+η,b uj) in v with ε > 0
and η > 0. We denote by y• = (yi,yj) (resp. z• = (zi,zj)) a menu implementing
(b ui,b uj + ε) (resp. (b ui + η,b uj)).
One can readily see that (b xi,yj) and (zi,b xj) satisfy incentive constraints. The
Pareto optimality of (b xi,b xj) in Fπ• implies that these pairs of contracts cannot belong
to Fπ•, and we must conclude that:
πj(yj) < πj(b xj), (13)
πi(zi) < πi(b xi). (14)
4For the proﬁt conditions, remark that, u being concave, expected value and expected utility are
not collinear. For the incentive constraints, note that the two independent operators ui and uj are
combined independently to generate the objective and the constraints.
16Proﬁt on (b xi,b xj) being zero, this implies in turn that
πi(yi) > πi(b xi), (15)
πj(zj) > πj(b xj). (16)
Now consider the menu of lotteries (lα
i ,lα
j ) where, for k = i,j, lα
k pays yk with probabil-
ity α and zk with probability 1−α. Menu (lα
i ,lα
j ) belongs to F and Pareto dominates
(b xi,b xj); moreover, by continuity of proﬁt functions, α0 exists such that
πi(l
α0




j ) ≥ πj(b xj), (18)
in contradiction with the fact that (b xi,b xj) is a maximum element in Fπ•.
Finally we prove that the mapping Π → u(F),π• 7→ u• is one-to-one. Each redis-
tribution proﬁle corresponds to a unique RCO, and a unique element of u(F). Assume
that two RCOs (b xi,b xj) and (b yi,b yj) implement the same payoﬀs (b ui,b uj). Without loss
of generality, suppose that πi(b xi) > πi(b yi). This condition implies that (b xi,b yj) imple-
ments the same utility as the RCOs, is feasible and makes strictly positive proﬁts.
This is impossible (Proposition 1/1).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Point 1. When type j’s incentive constraint is not binding, any possibility to im-
prove type i’s coverage is exploitable (Proposition 1/1), thus type i gets an i-eﬃcient
contract.
Point 2. Denote by π1
• and π2




more favorable to i than π2
•). Assume that b xi(π1








Assume that type i’s incentive constraint is binding at b x•(π1
•). Denote by c1
j the
coverage rate of b xj(π1
•). Denote by x2
j the contract whose coverage rate is c1
j and
which gives the same utility to i as x2
i. The single crossing condition imposes that
17since type j prefers b xj(π1
•) to b xi(π1





is incentive compatible. Remark also that this menu oﬀers more proﬁtable contracts
to both types than b x•(π1
•) (smaller value, for the same coverage rates). We conclude
that x2
i is implementable.
As long as type i’s incentive constraint is not binding at b x•(π1
•), then one can
increase proﬁts on that type without losing i-eﬃciency (which is what the proposition
says). Once the incentive constraint starts to be binding, the paragraph above can
be applied.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To ﬁx ideas, we suppose in this proof that qj ≥ qi.
Point 1. We reason by contradiction. Suppose that, given the redistribution proﬁle
π•, the RCO (b xi,b xj) is such that type j’s coverage cj is strictly smaller than cj.
Clearly, type j strictly prefers the corresponding j-eﬃcient contract xj to b xj. Consider
then contract yj which coverage equals cj and that gives to type j the same utility
as b xj. Obviously, this contract is less expensive than xj and b xj. Moreover, as type
j weakly prefers b xj to yj whenever c(b xj) < c(yj), single crossing conditions implies
that it is also the case for type i (ui(b xj) ≥ ui(yj)). It follows that menu (b xi,yj) is
feasible; however, it gives the same utility as the RCO and belongs to Fπ•; this is in
contradiction with the uniqueness result of Proposition 1.
Point 2. The following remark is instrumental. Call OI (for overinsurance) the set
of contracts whose coverage rates are greater or equal to cj. Take two contracts in OI,
if the one with the greatest expected wealth for j has the lowest coverage rate, then
it is the one preferred by i and j.
Consider two RCOs (b xi,b xj) and (b zi,b zj) such that type j’s expected wealth is
greater with b zj. We reason by contradiction. Suppose that c(b zj) < c(b xj).
1. Proposition 3/1 implies that c(b zj) ≥ cj; but c(b xj) > c(b zj) and thus c(b xj) > cj.
We conclude that b xj is not j-eﬃcient and ui(b xi) = ui(b xj).
2. Remark also that b zj gives more expected wealth to type j than b xj, therefore
Proposition 2/2 implies that b zj is not j-eﬃcient, and ui(b zj) = ui(b zi).
183. b zj is preferred to b xj by both types, because contracts b xj and b zj belong to OI
(Proposition 3/1) and the remark on OI above applies. We thus have
ui(b xi) = ui(b xj) < ui(b zj) = ui(b zi), (19)
meaning that b zi is preferred to contract b xi by type i.
4. b zi, though less expensive, is preferred to b xi by type i (equation 19). This implies
that b xi is not i-eﬃcient.
5. b x• is a pooling (b xi = b xj), the two incentive constraints being binding (points 1
and 4).
6. ci > cj, because from Proposition 3/1, and from point 5, one knows that
ci ≥ c(b xi) = c(b xj) > cj.
7. c(b zi) ≤ c(b zj) (property of any menu), c(b zj) < c(b xj) (by assumption), c(b xj) =
c(b xi) (point 5) and c(b xi) ≤ ci (Proposition 3/1). Consequently, b zi is not i-eﬃcient,
and uj(b zj) = uj(b zi).
8. b z• is a pooling (b zi = b zj), the two incentive constraints being binding (points 2
and 7).
9. pj < pi. Indeed, pooling b x• covers more than pooling b z•, and type j’s (type i’s)
expected wealth is smaller (resp. larger) with b x• than with b z•;
10. cj > ci, since pj < pi and qj > qi.
There is a contradiction between points 6 and 10.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Under weak adverse selection, there is at least one transfer system such that both
types get an eﬃcient contract at the RCO, and then c(b xi) = ci and c(b xj) = cj. This
implies that (qi − qj) · (ci − cj) ≥ 0. To prove the reciprocal, there are two cases to
be considered once, to ﬁx ideas, we assume that pi > pj.
qi > qj and ci > cj. Denote by xI the contract at the intersection of the two curves
of equations c(x) = ci and λi πi(x) + λj πj(x) = 0. Consider redistribution proﬁle
(πi(xI),πj(xI)) and the RCO for this proﬁle. Clearly xI = xi therefore b xi = xi is
i-eﬃcient.
We apply the same argument for xJ, the contract at the intersection of the two
19curves of equations c(x) = cj and λi πi(x) + λj πj(x) = 0. The corresponding re-
distribution proﬁle assigns a j-eﬃcient contract at the CPO to type-j policyholders.
However, since ci > cj, the transfers implicitly deﬁned by xJ are more favorable to
type j than (πi(xI),πj(xI)). So from Proposition 2/2, we deduce that type-j poli-
cyholders also get a j-eﬃcient contract at the RCO associated with (πi(xI),πj(xI)).
Consequently (xi,xj) is the RCO associated with this transfer. We are in a situation
of weak adverse selection.
qi < qj and ci < cj. We apply the intermediate value theorem to deﬁne implicitly
a redistribution such that the associated i- and j-eﬃcient contracts verify ui(xi) =
ui(xj). Given that c(xi) < c(xj), it follows that xi1 > xj1, and the single crossing
property of the indiﬀerence curves with qi < qj implies that uj(xi) < uj(xj), which
proves that (xi,xj) is feasible. We are in a situation of weak adverse selection.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Let ue
k(x) denote the indirect utility that type k with beliefs qe
k draws from contract
x.
A.5.1 Point 1





at least one strict inequality, then ui(y) ≥ ui(x) and uj(y) ≥ uj(x) with at least one
strict inequality.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the single-crossing property.
Suppose that (xi,xj) is a menu for parameters (Q,π•). Incentive constraints





j(xj), meaning that incentive constraints relative to
beliefs Qe are veriﬁed. We conclude that (xi,xj) is a menu relative to parameters
(Qe,π•).
20A.5.2 Point 2
Let π• be a redistribution proﬁle such that type i gets an i-eﬃcient contract, xi,
at the RCO with beliefs Q (the RCO is (xi,b xj)). We denote by xe
i the i-eﬃcient
contract relative to parameters (Qe,π•) (the RCO is (b xe
i,b xe
j)). We treat separately
cases qi = qe
i and qi 6= qe
i.
Case qi = qe
i. Point 1 of this theorem implies that (xi,b xj) is a also menu for pa-






i(xi). However, as qi = qe
i, xi = xe
i. We conclude that type i gets an
i-eﬃcient contract at the RCO relative to parameters (Qe,π•).
Case qi 6= qe
i. Type-i agents with beliefs qi and qe











i) < ui(xi). (21)




































where (25) is deduced from (20) and (23) while (26) is deduced from (22) and (24).
However, the RCO (b xe
i,b xe
j) relative to parameters (Qe,π•) Pareto dominates any
feasible menu for parameters (Qe,π•), and particularly (xe










21which implies in turn that b xe
i = xe
i. Type i gets an i-eﬃcient contract for the RCO
relative to parameters (Qe,π•).
A.5.3 Point 3
We know from Proposition 1 (/2 and /3) that the set of eﬃcient redistribution proﬁles
is an interval, so we have to check that this interval is bigger with beliefs Qe than with
beliefs Q. We focus, without loss of generality, on the RCO (xi,xj) that maximizes
type j’s utility for beliefs Q, the associated proﬁt being denoted by π•. We check that
the RCO relative to parameters (Qe,π•), (xe
i,xe
j), is also a second-best allocation.
An RCO is of one of the following three types: (a) the two contracts are type-
eﬃcient, (b) one of the contracts only is type-eﬃcient, (c) no contract is type-eﬃcient.
Point 2 of this theorem implies that the set of type-eﬃcient contracts cannot
decrease when beliefs are polarized. This implies that if (xi,xj) if of type (a), then
so is (xe
i,xe
j), and we are done, as for any case where (xe
i,xe
j) is of type (a). If (xi,xj)
if of type (b), the only case which is possible and nontrivial is (xe
i,xe
j) of type (b);
this is treated in “(b) to (b)”. If (xi,xj) if of type (c), the case (xe
i,xe
j) of type (c) is
treated in “(c) to (c)” and (xe
i,xe
j) of type (b) is treated in “(c) to (b)”.
The following lemma will be used on several occasions.
Lemma 2 Let (xi,b xj) be an RCO for beliefs Q in which xi is i-eﬃcient, type i’s
incentive constraint is binding and type j’s incentive constraint is not binding. (xi,b xj)















Proof. Let (xi,b xj) be an RCO in which type i is assigned an i-eﬃcient contract,
type i’s incentive constraint is binding and type j’s incentive constraint is not binding.
Notice that type j’s contract is fully determined by type i’s utility and expected
wealth. Given that xi is i-eﬃcient, b xj is fully determined by type i’s utility.
Modify b xj so that it gives the same utility to type j and it gives utility ui(b xj)+dε
to type i. This contract is unique (single-crossing condition). Meanwhile, we assign
to type i the i-eﬃcient contract that gives utility ui(b xj) + dε. By continuity, for a
small dε, type j prefers the modiﬁed b xj to the modiﬁed xi. Thus, by construction,
22the new pair of contract satisﬁes the incentive constraint for a small dε and type i is
indiﬀerent between the two oﬀers.
The original RCO is a second-best allocation if and only if the new menu cannot
be ﬁnanced, which is what we see now by analyzing the case dε > 0.
We denote by (dxj1,dxj2) the variation, component by component, of type j’s
contract and we denote u0(xj1) and u0(xj2) by u0
1 and u0
2 respectively. By construction
(1 − qj)u
0
1dxj1 + qj u
0
2dxj2 = 0, (29)
(1 − qi)u
0
1dxj1 + qi u
0



















As for type j, the variation of expected wealth is (1 − pj) dxj1 + pj dxj2; using (31)

















(b) to (b). We apply Lemma 2 for beliefs Q and Qe. To determine the sign of τ,
we study separately changes of type j’s and type i’s beliefs.
We ﬁrst check that, the RCO of interest maximizing type j’s utility, the charac-
teristics of the contracts are exactly those required by the lemma. If the type-eﬃcient
contract were type j’s, then uj(xi) = uj(xj) (to explain that the other contract is
ineﬃcient). We also know that ui(xi) = ui(xj) : indeed, if type i’s incentive constraint
were not binding, the RCO being continuous with respect to redistribution, type j’s
contract would remain j-eﬃcient with a (slightly) more favorable redistribution, but
the new contract to j would be better for this type than the optimum, a contradiction.
As a consequence of these two equalities, xi = xj : the RCO is a pooling. We ﬁnd
that xj is at the same time j-eﬃcient and optimal for j among pooling allocations, an
impossibility because this supposes that two diﬀerent marginal rates of substitution
are equal. The lemma is applicable.
23Type j’s beliefs are modiﬁed. For a given redistribution, the menu with
polarized beliefs (qi,qe
j) is the same as before since it depends on pi, pj and qi but
not on qj. We can now calculate the variations the τ with respect to qj. Remark that




















































This expression being always positive, the considered redistribution remains eﬃcient
for the polarized beliefs.
Type i’s beliefs are modiﬁed. We parameterize the eﬀects on the menu of
changing qi. Point 1 of this theorem states that type j’s utility increases when beliefs
are polarized; the increase of type j’s utility is a monotonic function denoted by η(qe
i).




(1 − pj)dxj1 + pj dxj2 = 0,
(1 − qj)u0















where ∆ = (1 − pj)qj u0
2 − pj (1 − qj)u0
1 (∆ 6= 0 since type j coverage is ineﬃcient).
Given that τ(qi,qj) = 0, simple algebra shows that ∆ · (qi − qj) > 0.
We distinguish two cases, A : qe
i < qi < qj and B : qe
i > qi > qj. We show that
τ(·,qj) multiplied by a well-chosen positive function increases when we pass from qi
to qe
i, which is suﬃcient to establish that τ(qe
i,qj) > 0. We can then conclude that
the redistribution proﬁle considered remains eﬃcient for beliefs (qe
i,qj).
Case A : qe
i < qi < qj. Deﬁne
τA(qi,qj) = (1 − qi)τ(qi,qj) =
λi(1 − pi)
u0(xi1)













We can now collect the arguments.
1. When we pass from qi to qe
i, the i-eﬃcient contract oﬀers less coverage to type
i, meaning that xi1 increases as well as the ﬁrst term of τA(qi,qj);
2. fA and ∂fA/∂qi are positive;
3. gA is negative at qe






< 0. The derivative ∂gA/∂η at the same point is calculated




qj (1 − pj)pj u00(xj1)
∆ (u0(b xj1))2 +
(1 − qj)pj (1 − pj)u00(xj2)
∆ (u0(b xj2))2 , (40)
which is positive (∆ < 0 since qi − qj < 0).
4. Type j’s utility increases when qe
i diminishes (∂η/∂qi < 0).












is unambiguously negative, and we conclude that τA(qi,qj) increases when the ﬁrst
variable decreases.
Case B : qe
i > qi > qj. Deﬁne
τB(qi,qj) = qi τ(qi,qj) =
λipi
u0(xi2)






gB(xj(η)) = gA(xj(η)). (44)




(1 − qi) u0(xi1)
u0(xi2)
. (45)
The useful arguments are the following.
251. When we pass from qi to qe
i, the i-eﬃcient contract oﬀers more coverage to type
i, meaning that xi2 increases as well as the ﬁrst term in τB(qi,qj);
2. fB is negative and its derivative ∂fB/∂qi is positive;
3. gB is positive at qe
i = qi ; indeed, fB ·gB < 0. The derivative ∂gB/∂η is negative
(see (40) with ∆ > 0 since qi − qj > 0).
4. Type j’s utility increases when qe
j increases (∂η/∂qi > 0).












is unambiguously negative, and we conclude that τB(qi,qj) increases when the ﬁrst
variable increases.
(c) to (c). Denote the RCO by (z,z). By continuity of the RCO with respect to
redistribution, the RCO for beliefs Qe remains of type (c) in a open neighborhood of
π•. If the RCO for parameters (Qe,π•) were not eﬃcient, then there would be another










with a least one strict inequality. Lemma 1 implies then that:
ui(Z) ≥ ui(z) and uj(Z) ≥ uj(z). (48)
with at least one strict inequality, which implies that (z,z) is not a second-best menu
relative to beliefs Q, a contradiction.
(c) to (b). Deﬁne Q(λ) = (1 − λ)Q+λQe. Beliefs are increasingly polarized as λ
goes from 0 to 1. Deﬁne π•(λ) as the redistribution that maximizes type j’s utility
for beliefs Q(λ). It suﬃces to show that πj(λ) is smaller than πj (more transfers to
type j).
We reason by contradiction. Assume that for some λ, πj(λ) > πj.
261. The RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•) is not a second-best allocation since it
gives more expected wealth to type j than π•(λ).
2. The RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•) is of type (b), since it cannot be of type
(a) without contradicting 1 and it cannot be of type (c) ((c) to (b) would be
applicable but it contradicts 1).
3. At the RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•), only one type gets a type-eﬃcient con-
tract. If it were type j, then type j would also obtain a j-eﬃcient contract at
the RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•(λ)), since πj(λ) > πj (see Proposition 2).
This conﬁguration would contradict the beginning of (b) to (b). We conclude
that type i gets an i-eﬃcient contract for the RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•)
and also for the RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•(λ))
Denote by λ∞ the largest λ in [0,1] such that for all µ ∈ [0,λ), the RCO associated
with (Q(µ),π•) is a second-best allocation.
1. By continuity, the RCO associated with (Q(λ∞),π•) is a second-best allocation.
This implies that πj(λ∞) ≤ πj.
2. In any interval [λ∞,λ∞ + ε), there is at least some µ such that the RCO as-
sociated with (Q(µ),π•) is not a second-best allocation. This implies that (i)
πj(µ) > πj and that (ii) the RCO associated with (Q(µ),π•(µ)) is of type (b)
(see 1-3 above). From (i), we draw that by continuity, πj(λ∞) ≥ πj.
We conclude from 1-2 that πj(λ∞) = πj i.e. π•(λ∞) = π•, and that the RCO
associated with (Q(λ∞),π•) is a second-best allocation of type (b). Paragraph (b)
to (b) is now applicable with (Q(λ∞),π•) as starting point: for all λ ≥ λ∞, the
RCO associated with (Q(λ),π•) is a second-best allocation. Consequently, λ∞ = 1,
implying that the RCO associated with (Qe,π•) is a second-best allocation.
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Figure 2 : The effect of risk perceptions on adverse selection
1
1
⇒ λiπi + λjπj = 0 (1)
⇒ λiπi + λjπj > 0 (2)
⇒ more transfers to i (3) >>>